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A PRIMER ON E.E.C. AGRICULTURAL POLICIES
Agricultural policy and performance are of central importance
to the functioning of the entire mechanism of the European Economic
Community. Almost by definition this policy is exceedingly intricate.
More regulations have been issued concerning agriculture than for
any other single topic covered by the Treaty of Rome. Because of
its length this comment can indicate the complexity of the subject
only by reference. The discussion is divided roughly into two parts.
The first deals with the position of agriculture in the Community
countries and with the problems of applying the theory of the Common
Market to it. The second part traces the development of actual
E.E.C. agricultural policy.
PART I
Prior to the Treaty of Rome, the agricultural segment of the
economy had been removed by government intervention from the free
market system in all of the member states of the E.E.C. Intervention
resulted primarily from the chronic malfunctioning of the market
system. In the case of many agricultural products the market had
proved to be "a very uncertain and inadequate means of either short
or long run adjustments of supply and demand, or of the achievement
of the most desired patterns of resource allocation and income dis-
tribution within any country."l
These desired patterns of resource allocation were not strictly
economic in origin. For some counties agricultural self-sufficiency
was a national strategic goal; maintainance of a strong diversified
agricultural sector was considered part of the national defense.2
The national governments worked to create some degree of income par-
ity between industrial and agricultural workers for reasons of social
and political stability. As part of overall fiscal policy the pur-
chasing power of the farmers had to be maintained. At the same time,
the population as a whole had to be protected from overly high food
prices. To encourage needed investment in agricultural capital,
market stability was needed. The European governments responded to
1. L. V. Castle, International Policy on Agricultural Trade, 4 J.
COMM. MKT. STUDIES 47, 49, (1966).
2. J. 0. COPPOCK, ATLANTIC AGRICULTURAL UNITY 40, 41, (1966).
these needs and pressures with a panoply of supports, subsidies,
quotas, and other restrictions. 3 This response was only natural
considering the political weight of the farm sector. In the E.E.C.
states, as a group, nearly 20% of the populatiog lives on farms, as
compared to only about 8% in the United States.
The physical conditions in Europe are less favorable to agricul-
ture than they are in many parts of the world. This disadvantage
results from often rugged terrain, overused, tired soil, and unec-
onomically small land tenure patterns. There has long been a need
for "rationalization" of the entire sector in order to attain an
efficiency comparable to that of outside producers. Such rational-
ization had proven to be almost impossible to achieve within the con-
text of the national agricultural programs.
During the first wave of Pan-European sentiment after the Second
World War it was widely recognized that the manifest ills of Euro-
pean agriculture could not be adequately treated by uncoordinated
national policies. A series of conferences and studies were under-
taken, largely under the aegis of the Organization of European Eco-
nomic Cooperation, to examine the possibility of an international
system of agricultural improvement. These efforts defined the prob-
lems and proposed some of the possible solutions. The fruits of
this work will be discussed in Part II, dealing with the development
of the E.E.C. policy.
The underlying problem facing any attempt to establish a common
market in agricultural products was the existence of widely differ-
ing price levels in the six states. The differences in the price
level reflected both physical limitations in the agricultural sector
and the effect of government intervention. The price of soft wheat,
for example, differed by more than 50% between the highest and lowest
cost producers in 1958-1959.5 Luxembourg and Germany have the high-
est costs and France, the lowest, although the French figures are
still well above those from North America.
Paradoxically, although the European countries are typically
high cost producers of agricultural goods, one of the primary prob-
lems has been overprodudtion. Demand for such goods as potatoes,
3. See, Heller, Agricultural Policy of the European Economic
Community, 5 HARV. INT'L. L. C. J. 45, 56 et seq., for a
country survey of prior practice.
4. OECD, AGRICULTURE AND ECONOMIC GROWTH, 106-107, Table 6, (1966).
5. COMMENT, The Formation of the Agricultural Law of the European
Common Market, 1 TEXAS INT'L. L. FORUM 89, 95, (1965).
soft wheat, vegetables, and pork did not rise as fast as the supply.
National policies aimed at self sufficiency largely caused this im-
balance. These policies allowed marginal producers to "hang on" des-
pite their inefficiency. Any permanent action which would equalize
prices at a market determined level would eliminate these producers.6
Accompanying the overproduction problem was a continuing lag in
farm income vis a vis that in the industrial sectors. The artifi-
di~ll-yhighprices were matched by high production costs, thereby
narrowing any margin of profit. The farm sector was thus afflicted
with high costs, overproduction, and falling incomes. The situation
can only be cited as an example of the failure of the farm policies
of the states involved.
High agricultural prices in Germany were maintained by govern-
ment Import and Stock Offices. These agencies exercised market con-
trol by means of price supports, commodity stockpiling, and "equal-
ization fees" on imports." This program effectively insulated the
German market from intra-European trade. Goods from outside of
Europe made up the bulk of the German food deficit, but at prices
which would not injure the German producers. Nhile these producers
were protected from effective foreign competition, the consumers paid
the price for inefficiency and lack of specialization.
The French faced different problems. Although significantly
higher than world costs, the French production costs are the lowest
in Europe for many commodities. It has been a consistent French
goal to use their relative efficiency to become the "bread basket"
of Europe. During the 1950's France encouraged exports by means of
subsidies, and restricted imports of lower cost commodities. The
existence of effective import restrictions in other western European
nations, however, deprived the French in large measure of what they
felt to be their natural market. Exclusion from this market placed
great strain on the export subsidy program and created a major sur-
plus problem.9
In light of the problems faced by the Six individually, it was
6. Heller, supra., at 51.
7. E.E.C. COMMISSION, Report on the Economic Situation in the
Countries of the Community 212, (1958).
8. OECD, AGRICULTURAL POLICIES IN 1966, 611 et seq., (1966).
9. Dam, The European Common Market in Agriculture, 67 COLUM,
L. R. 209, 213, note 16, (1967); see also, Heller, supra., 57-
59.
clear that the creation of a common market in agriculture would have
a profound effect on each of the countries involved. The Germans, and
the other high cost producers, would have to face a flood of lower
cost French goods, which, in the absence of controls, would drive a
substantial number inefficient farmers off the market. Moreover,
farm income might be expected to drop radically from a combination
of lower prices and decreased volume. The French, on the other
hand, would benefit handsomely from the removal of internal restric-
tions since their surpluses could then easily be sold in the urban
centers of the surrounding nations. At the same time these French
goods would be protected from lower cost, non-European sources.
While the French had a vital interest in creating an agricultural
common market, it is quite apparent that immediate economic problems
for the farm sectors of the high cost'nations would also result.
The French aim of including agriculture in the Common Market
framework, on French terms, has been regarded by other members of
the Community as the price to be paid for French participation in
European industrial integration. This "price" is a high one only in
the relative short run, since it is in the long run interest of each
nation to consume the lowest cost product, and to re-align produc-
tion in the most efficient pattern.
The problems presented by the application of the common market
idea to agriculture in Europe can be classified under two broad head-
ings. The first is the question of how short run price effects could
be minimized in order to prevent major dislocations in those high
cost areas which hitherto had been protected by national policies.
The second is, given the need to prevent hardship resulting from
price harmonization, how to bring about structural changes which will
erase the wage differential between agricultural and industrial work-
ers and which will allow modernization within the sector.
These problems are moving ever closer to solution within the
Community. Final transition to the "single market stage" for free
movement of agricultural products with common prices throughout the
Community will have taken place by July 1, 1968. The E.E.C. Commis-
sion calls the successful implementation of the agricultural common
market "the guarrantee of future progress in other sectors of Com-
munity activity."1 0 Part II discusses the techniques through which
this significant success has been achieved.
10. E.E.C. COMMISSION, Tenth General Report on the Activities of the
Communities 45, (1967).
PART II
A. Treaty Provisions Relating to Agriculture
The E.E.C. Treaty devotes Articles 38 through 47 to the topic
of agriculture, but despite the statement in Article 38.4 that a
common agricultural policy be established, and the list of objectives
of the common agricultural policy in Artitle 39, there is very little
in the Treaty suggesting what this policy should be.1 1 This section
of the Treaty is merely bare bones without the type of deatiled sub-
stantive provisions to be found in other parts of the Treaty. The
decision of the six Member State.z to include agriculture in the
planned Common Market was, in itself, a momentous step. From the
disappointing history of international attempts to solve agricultural
problems this decision was not at all a foregone conclusion.
A program of trade liberalization, involving raw materials, man-
ufactured goods, and agricultural commodities had been undertaken in
1949 by the members of the Organization of European Economic Coopera-
tion. This program dealt only with the progressive elimination of
quantitative restrictions on imports. The program was much less
successful in removing quotas from agricultural goods than from other
types of goods, merely demonstrating the intransigence of the agri-
cultural problem.1 2 The program covered, moreover, only a single
example of many trade barriers. It was felt by many people in Eu-
roPe, almost before this plan was initiated, that a far more compre-
hensive approach was necessary to deal specifically with the problems
of agriculture, The Schuman Plan, basis of the European Coal and
Steel Community, seemed to be a model for this comprehensive approach.
Specific proposals along this line were made by both the French
and the Dutch governments. These proposals, the Pflimlin and the
Mansholt Plans were similar insofar as each called for the establish-
ment of supranational organs which would create and run programs re-
ducing trade barriers and aiming toward expanded and specialized pro-
duction of agricultural products. The Mansholt Plan is of particular
significance, first because it was the more comprehensive of the two,
and second because its author became the chief agricultural planner
for the E.E.C. Commission. The Mansholt Plan contained the nucleus
of the common agricultural policy of the E.E.C.
The Mansholt Plan was premised on the special (i.e., non-market)
nature of the agricultural sector, and on the desirability of main-
11. 289 U.N.T.S. 3 (1958).
12. Heller, supra, at 90-91.
taining the family farm.1 3 A gradual approach to integration of ag-
ricultural markets was advocated. Coupled with this proposal were
coordinated programs of trade restriction removal and equalization
of production costs. The Plan sought to attack both the price and
the structural problems of integration. Mansholt wrote in 1952:
.[It will be necessary to maintain a price level
which will yield farmers a profit, and this means that
subsidies and levies will be unavoidable in intra-European
trade, at least for the transitional period. The expend-
iture and income involved should be charged to and used by
a European Agricultural Fund; help for technical develop-
ment for areas with high costs could come from this Fund.l
4
It will be seen that several aspects of the Treaty and the common ag-
ricultural policy (CAP) were already present in this proposal. Des-
pite these energetic programs, discussion of the topic of agricul-
tural integration lapsed briefly after the defeat of the proposed
European Defense Community in 1954.
The actual basis of the Treaty provisions concerning agriculture
was provided by neither of these plans, but rather by the Spaak Re-
port of 1956, which was written in response to the tentative approv-
al of the creation of a Common Market by the Foreign Ministers of the
Six in 1966. This report urged inclusion of agriculture, emphasiz-
ing that the national agricultural programs were inadequate to meet
the problems, and that the flexibility and scope of an international
program were needed.15 The conclusions of the Report, insofar as it
concerned agriculture, were incorporated almost verbatim into Arti-
cles 38 to 47 of the Treaty.
Detailed proposals for implementing a common market in agricul-
ture were not formulated at the time the Treaty was adopted, and as
a result the agriculture section is a mere outline. The actual char-
acter of the Common Agricultural Policy (hereinafter CAP) was left
unresolved. To fill in the details of the CAP the Commission was re-
quired to convene a conference of Member States to prepare a state-
13. Mansholt, Towards European Integration, 31 FOR. AFFAIRS 106, at
110, (1952).
14. Id., at 111.
15. D. CAMPS, THE EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET AND AMERICAN POLICY App.
at ix (Princeton Center of Inttl. Studies Policy Memorandum
No. 11, 1956).
ment of needs and resources (Article 43.1). This conference was
held in Stresa, Italy in 1958, and resulted in a resolution o basic
principles of the CAP which is probably still binding today.
The E.E.C. Commission was given primary authority to prepare
the content of the CAP, taking account of the work of the Conference,
and was required to submit its proposals to the Council for adoption
and issuance as regulations (Article 43.2). These procedures make
possible the separate treatment of the agricultural sector and in-
sulate it from the full effect of the other Treaty provisions, in
accord with the intent of Article 39.2. The freedom which Council
control of the programs gave to the Member States to "hedge their
bets" during the transitional stages was perhaps an essential condi-
tion for ratification of the entire Treaty.
The Treaty Articles of main operative effect are Articles 40 and
43. The former provides that the CAP shall be established during the
transitional period by setting up a "common organization of markets."
The organization's methods of operation are suggested, and there is
a reference to financing which provides that "funds" may be set up
to achieve the objectives of the CAP. Article 43 lays out the time-
table for the establishment of the CAP. It makes clear that the
Council holds the basic power in the area, but that in accordance
with the typical E.E.C. pattern, the Commission was to make the de-
tailed proposals for creating the CAP. A key constitutional provi-
sion is found in Article 43.3, which allows initiation of the supra-
national market organization on the basis of a qualified majority
vote of the Council. This provision prevented the possibility of a
single country veto of the establishment of the agricultural common
market, and gave a strong supranational power to the Comminity.
Council voting on other matters was by unanimity during the
first two stages of the establishment of the Community, with qual-
ified majority voting thereafter. Other Articles (44, 45, 46) con-
tain permission for Member States to continue or initiate protective
practices not inconsistent with the eventual establishment of the
CAP, until the end of the transitional stage.
B. Establishment of the Common Agricultural Policy
The adoption of the first agricultural regulations under the
Treaty was one of the most significant events in the history of the
E.E.C. Agreement on Regulations 19 through 23 was reached in the
Council on January 14, 1962, and they were issued on April 4,
16. [1958] E.E.C. J.0. 281.
1962.17 Agreement on these Regulations was the resolution of a long
series of debates in the Council. These debates dealt with the crit-
ical issue of which nation was to bear the primary burden of the
changes to be brought about by the lowering of tariff and quota walls
The regulations finally agreed upon were substantially unchanged from
the proposals of the Commission, although the proportions of the fi-
nancing agreement were somewhat altered. The Regulations instituted
the price-levy system and established Common Market organizations
for a number of products, including grains, fruits, and vegetables.
The Commission's proposals were divided into four main elements.
These were: policy on market structures, market policy, commerLcal
policy, and common social policy in the field of agriculture.1 0
I. Structural Policy
The Commission's proposals for structural policy are directed
first at improvement of the infrastructure of rural areas, e.&.,
transport, schools and services; second, at re-arrangement of land
holdings and land usage to more efficient patterns; third, at spec-
ialization in the form of "improved adaptation of farming systems
to the existing conditions of soil and climate and to the market
situation."1 9 A major principle of the program is that the Cormmun-
ity act only as a coordinating and supervisory agent with regard to
structural policies. The major responsibility for actual implemen-
tation lies with the governments of the Member States. The Commis-
sion also proposed that financial aid, in addition to that made
available by the Member States, could be granted by the Community to
projects when necessary.20
These proposals are embodied in a Council decision which created
a Standing Committee on Agricultural Structures.2 1 This Committee,
attached to the Commission, reports to the Council and to the Euro-
pean Parliament concerning national policies on structural change,°and
the need for program financing, if any.
17. [1962] E.E.C. J.0. 933, et seq.
18. E.E.C. Commission, 2nd Report 126 (1961).
19. E.E.C. Commission, 3rd Report 166-167 (1962).
20. Id., at 168.
21. 1962 E.E.C. J.0. 2892 et seq.
An analogous supervisory type program has been established in
the area of social policy.
2. Market and Commercial Policy
"The aim of the market policy must be to establish among the
agricultural markets of the Member States a common market which will
have the characteristics of an internal market."2 2 With these words,
the Commission describes the heart of the agricultural program, the
market policy. This policy, however, cannot really be considered
separately from what the Commission calls the commercial policy.
This latter policy is basically the attitude of the Community as a
whole toward external producers and purchasers.
Underlying both of these parts of the CAP are the price and
levy systems. The mechanism of these systems can be most clearly
seen with regard to the market in cereals under Regulation 19.
This Regulation provided for a gradual approximation of grain
prices from country to country, leading to the single market stage
for cereals. The Regulation was primarily a transitional measure,
and it has been superseded by Regulation 120/67, which establishes
the mechanism for pricing in the single market stage of the agricul-
tural community.2 3
3. The Price and Levy Systems
The basic decision of the Commission and the Council with regard
to prices was4to create market stability and to aid agricultural in-
come by means of assured prices for agricultural commodities. In
other words a price support system was decided upon rather than an
income-deficienc payment system in which prices are allowed to seek
their own level.W A support system entails purchase of any excess
production at a set price. This, of course, assures farmers of some
stable minimum income from their crops if the market price falls.
Where there is effective competition from lower cost producing areas,
simple governmental purchase of goods becomes prohibitively expensive
unless imports are restricted in some way. To be effective, the
price system must be protected from imports. In the E.E.C. this pro-
tection is by means of the variable levy.
The variable levy has replaced all other forms of import re-
22. E.E.C. Commission, Report 169 (1960).
23. 1 CCH COMM. MKT. REP. Para. 428 (1967).
24. Dam, supra note 9, at 215.
striction on cereals in the E.E.C. The levy system is based on a
price for each commodity which is chosen in advance by the admin-
istering agency. The price chosen is the one at which it is intended
that the goods sell internally. The charge or levy upon import of
that particular type of good is varied periodically so that the
charge, plus the lowest world market price in that commodity, will
total the desired internal "target price." The levy will exclude
imports of the commodity only so long as the local market price is
less than or equal to the target price. On the other hand, fluctua-
tions in outside, or foreign, costs cannot affect the prices paid to
the domestic producers.
This brief outline of the price-levy system does not really
describe the actual single-market stage of the E.E.C., much less the
more complicated transitional stage. To do this, several additional
terms and concepts have to be employed.
The target price, the intended internal selling price of a par-
ticular commodity, was originally set by the individual Member States,
and now in the single-market stage it is set by the Council.2 5 This
term is defined as the price " . . . sought to be obtained at the
purchasing phase of the wholesale level for soft wheat, barley, rye,
and corn in the commercial center of that area which has the greatest
deficit in that particular commodity.t12
6
The price at which support is maintained, the "intervention
price," is the target price less an amount between five and ten
percent. It is at this price that designated agencies of the Mem-
ber States are obligated to purchase any excess production.
Imports are controlled by the threshold price. This price is
set equal to the target price of the commodity, less the cost of
transportation from the place of importation to the market center
with the greatest deficit in that grain commodity. The variable
levy is calculated on the basis of this price. This calculation is
d6ne by taking the C.I.F. price of the import before any import
charges are levied on them, and adding an amount sufficient to raise
the C.I.F. price to the level of the threshold price. The amount
added is the variable levy.
25. Pursuant to Regulation 128/67, single prices for gains were
established throughout the Community on July 1, 1967. 1 CCH
COMM. MKT. REP. Para. 428 (1967).
26. S. Riesenfeld, Common Market for Agricultural Products and
Common Agricultural Policy in the E.E.C., 1965 U. ILL. L.F.
658, 667 (1965).
The C.I.F. price is calculated " . . for Rotterdam on the
basis of the most favorable purchase possibilities on the world mar-
ket. . .. The differences in quality shall be expressed by equaliza-
tion coefficients."2 7 The Commission is empowered to determine the
official C.I.F. price, and it does this daily, between 3:00 and 4:00
p.m. The Commission's determination of the C.I.F. price is apparently
final unless a gross deviation from its published standards is proved.
The specific facts upon which the Commission relies are pot able to
be discovered upon a challenge by a dissatisfied party.20 However,
even after it is clear how the levy is established, only the surface
of the situation has been touched.
While it has been the aim, and since 1967 the actuality, to have
a single, Community price for cereals, this price is not a real one.
The basic target price of' wheat, for example, has been set at $106.25
per ton.2 9 But this figure is really irrelevant once the threshold
price has been determined from it. The significant prices internally
are only the intervention prices in any given market. These prices
are "regionalized" for each intervention center. This regionaliza-
tion takes account of transportation costs so that goods will flow
from the surplus areas in the Community to deficit areas. Without
this regionalization farmers would tend to sell to the local inter-
vention centers rather than to wholesalers in deficit areas whenever
the market price dips. The EEC has set the intervention prices lower
in surplus areas by an amount approximately equal to the transporta-
tion costs to the desired deficit area.
The 1967 derived intervention prices reflect not only transpor-
tation factors but also allowances designed to minimize the effect
of imposition of the "single market" stage. These allowances seem
to be merely a disguised way of avoiding, for a time, a single, mar-
ket-wide price, with its attendant hardships for high cost produc-
ers.
3 0
An additional factor affecting internal price levels is the
export program. It is Community policy to encourage exports of agri-
cultural commodities. In order to allow such exports to take place,
the Council has acted to grant export refunds to cover the differ-
27. Regulation 120/67, Art. 13.2, 1 CCH COMM. MKT. L. REP. Para. 428N.
28. See, Schwarze v. Einfuhr-und Vorratsstelle fur Getreide und
Futtermittil, Ct. of Justice of the European Communities Case
No. 16/65; 5 Com. Mar. L. Rep. 173, 189.
29. Dam, supra, 223.
30. Id., 225.
ence between price quotations on world markets and the generally
higher prices in the Community.3 1 The amount of such export subsi-
dies will exert a direct influence on the level of producer prices
within the Community, for on the average the higher the subsidy, the
higher the internal prices.
Although the common market in cereals, outlined above, is an
important area, there are very many products and product groups which
have market organizations significantly different from that in cer-
eals. Somewhat related to the cereals in concept are the so-called
grain conversion products, such as pork, eggs, and poultry, whose
prices are largely influenced by the price of feed grains. For
these products no target or intervention prices have been estab-
lished, probably because the control exercised through the cereals
program is deemed sufficient. To prevent or mitigate severe price
drops, the intervention agencies are empowered to purchase these
products (prijicipally pork to date) or to aid private stocks in pur-
chasing.3 2
Protection from imports is by means of a "sluice gate price."
This price is the minimum below which no grain conversion product
can be imported. The exporter either guarantees to sell at or above
the sluicegate price, or else a levy will be imposed to bring the
offered price up to the sluice gate price.3 3 From time to time
additional items have been added to this type of arrangements.
A third major class of goods is typified by fresh fruits, wines,
and vegetables. For these goods also, no target or intervention
prices have been set or planned. The means of import control is by
means of quality standards and control. These standards are deter-
mined by the Mana-ement Committee for the sector, with the approval
of the Council.34-
The institution of Management Committees has proved to be a key
part of the success of the CAP.3 5 These Committees have been a
31. Regulation 120/67 Article 16, 1 CCH COMM. MKT. L. REP. Para.
428R, (1967).
32. Regulation 121/67, Article 3, 1 CCH COMM. MKT. L. REP. Para.
451(c).
33. Id., Article 12, 1 CCH COMM. MKT. L. REP. Para. 451c.
34. Regulation 23, 1 CCH COMM. MKT. L. REP. Para. 567.
35. See, Olmi, The Agricultural Policy of the Community, 1 COM.
MT. L. REV. 118, 143 et seq. (1962).
strong supranational force within the Community eliminating much of
the need for Council approval of specific measures. A Management
Committee has been established for each of the product groups
covered by common organization of markets. They are composed of
representatives of the Member States with a Commission representa-
tive as chairman. They render opinions on measures proposed for
their product group. Measures which the Commission proposes go into
immediate effect, subject only to the opinion of the Management
Committee. If the Committee disapproves--and only if it disapproves
--is the measure referred to the Council. The council may then,
within one month, adopt a different measure. Upon failure of the
Council to act, the original measure of the Commission is put into
force.
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